Using networks towards global labor standards? Organizing social responsibility in global production chains by Fichter, Michael & Sydow, Jörg
www.ssoar.info
Using networks towards global labor standards?
Organizing social responsibility in global
production chains
Fichter, Michael; Sydow, Jörg
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Rainer Hampp Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Fichter, M., & Sydow, J. (2002). Using networks towards global labor standards? Organizing social responsibility
in global production chains. Industrielle Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, 9(4),
357-380. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-346198
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Industrielle Beziehungen, 9. Jg., Heft 4, 2002  357 
 
Michael Fichter, Jörg Sydow* 
Using Networks Towards Global Labor Standards?  
Organizing Social Responsibility in Global Production Chains** 
The prosperity of spreading economic globalization often rests on subjecting labor to 
working conditions which violate elementary human rights. Political, and to a markedly les-
ser extent, academic controversies over counter-measures have developed with a primarily 
focus on cases of buyer-driven global commodity chains. With general and judicable global 
standards non-existent, consumer and shareholder pressure plus internal goals for setting 
labor standards have led some globally active enterprises to voluntarily adopt codes of con-
duct as a means of dealing with this problem all along the commodity chain. Using some 
basic tenets of structuration theory and insights based on an exploratory empirical analysis 
of three cases from the apparel industry, this paper looks at such codes as a tool of corpo-
rate social responsibility. From this, it goes on to ask whether the form and the shape of the 
inter-organizational network are conducive or a hindrance to achieving acceptable labor 
standards. Following a brief review of the problems associated with achieving generally re-
cognized global labor standards, the paper concludes with an appraisal of the need to em-
bed corporate social responsibility in a comprehensive institutional framework in the inte-
rest of human rights and global labor standards. 
Mit Hilfe von Netzwerken zu globalen Arbeitsstandards? Zur Organisation von sozialer   
Verantwortlichkeit in weltumspannenden Produktionsketten 
In einer sich globalisierenden Ökonomie wird Arbeit nicht selten in einer Form organisiert, 
die gegen die elementarsten Menschenrechte verstößt. Dieser Tendenz wird von in Fragen sozial 
verantwortlicher Unternehmungsführung besonders engagierten Unternehmungen entgegen ge-
wirkt, indem entsprechende Verhaltenskodizes formuliert und nicht nur in der Unternehmung, son-
dern auch in ihrem globalen Zuliefernetzwerk implementiert werden. Allerdings stößt die Imple-
mentierung dort auf zum Teil kaum zu überwindende Schwierigkeiten. Die Organisationsform des 
Netzwerks wird in Hinblick darauf untersucht, inwiefern und unter welchen Bedingungen sie einer 
in Hinblick auf die Einhaltung globaler Arbeitsstandards sozial verantwortlichen Unternehmungs- 
bzw. Netzwerkführung entgegensteht oder aber unterstützt. Die Rolle des institutionellen Kontexts 
einer sozialverantwortlichen Führung wird dabei berücksichtigt und verschiedene denkbare Regu-
lierungsmodi angesprochen. Die Untersuchung ist von strukturationstheoretischen Grundüberle-
gungen getragen und basiert empirisch auf der explorativen Analyse von drei Fallstudien aus der 
Bekleidungsindustrie.  
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1. Global Commodity Chains and Labor Regulatory Regimes 
The changes which have altered the global economy over the past half century 
are without a doubt far-reaching. In a world of accelerated innovations in information 
and communications technology, improved and inexpensive transportation logistics 
and liberalized worldwide trade, global commodity and production chains are no lon-
ger exceptional. Especially for the wage and labor intensive sectors of the industria-
lized countries, production relocation to reduce costs and run time, improve produc-
tivity, or gain market shares has become an imperative and indeed viable option no 
longer open only to the limited field of global players. The resulting withdrawal from 
the relatively highly regulated realm of the welfare state labor market has not only 
been a contributing factor to changes in the production regime, it has also dovetailed 
with pressures for the further opening of national regimes of labor market regulation. 
„In other words, as economic activity became more internationalized, the embedded-
ness of labour in national regulatory regimes was threatened by deregulation arising 
from the adoption of neo-liberal policies” (Waddington 1999: 2). 
While labor has been deeply challenged in meeting these liberalization and de-
regulation processes within a national context, its position beyond the national level, 
characterized by the patchwork state of international labor regulation, has been decid-
edly weaker. Cross-border cooperation among often extremely heterogeneous na-
tional organizations is still more a programmatic goal than reality, although the often 
glaring deficits in labor regulations and their implementation make unions an impor-
tant force in securing global labor standards. International trade unionism, however, 
has not been capable of exercising a decisively protective role regarding labor stan-
dards, and the official promulgator of such norms, the International Labour Office 
(ILO), is not empowered to act as an effective guardian and too often, the ILO must 
defer to the priorities of such powerful institutions as the IMF and the World Bank. A 
closer look at the involvement of all three of these bodies in Central and Eastern 
Europe over the past decade is an exemplary indication of the lack of complementary 
working relationships (Götting 1998; Müller 1999). 
Increasing globalization of production on the one hand and a lack of institutions 
that secure minimum labor standards around the globe on the other have fostered the 
growth of global information and campaign networks and a culture of international 
concern for the recognition of universal human rights and the closing of the „respon-
sibility gap“ regarding the condition of labor in the global economy (Braun 2001: 
258). The interaction between human rights interest groups and campaigns on the one 
side, whose efficacy is significantly enhanced by mass media and the internet, and en-
terprise concerns for social responsibility on the other, has led to the development of 
a new company-driven approach to the problem of defining, implementing and con-
trolling global standards for labor: the use of codes of conducts as a pivotal part of a 
strategy for corporate social responsibility.  
In this paper we will analyze the problems and prospects of organizing for social 
responsibility in global commodity and production chains in general and the use of 
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such codes as an instrument for instituting minimum or core labor standards in par-
ticular. Our focus is on the issue of production governance in networks and its (inter-) 
organizational practices in global commodity and production chains. In line with the 
findings of similar studies (Frenkel 2001; Waddock et al. 2002), we argue, that al-
though unsatisfactory labor conditions are to be found in (and may even be fostered 
by) networks, this organizational form of economic activity is also a potentially effec-
tive means for organizing the governance of social responsibility in global commod-
ity and production chains, at least under certain structural and institutional circum-
stances. Through a comparison of the dimensions of market, hierarchy and network 
forms of governance, we will present arguments and some preliminary evidence as to 
why networks are superior to the market when it comes to organizing for social re-
sponsibility, and again under certain circumstances, come close to matching the gov-
ernance capacities of hierarchical modes. Moreover, because of the strategic flexibil-
ity attributed to networks as well as for many other economic reasons not to be ex-
plored here (see Gulati 1998), these must be increasingly regarded as supplanting the 
hierarchical mode as the organizational model of the future.  
In the main part of the paper (Section 2) we will introduce market, network and 
hierarchy as three distinct forms of production governance, and investigate the condi-
tions under which the network form might be a quite effective means for implement-
ing global labor standards via codes of conduct. In this context, we will also address 
issues of the internal organization of the so-called hub firms leading such networks. 
Our argument will be developed around the structuration theory of Giddens (1984) 
and will draw on three case studies using interviews with managers from globally 
sourcing retail and manufacturing companies in the apparel industry located in Ger-
many. 
Beyond the immediate commodity and production network, we will address the 
broader institutional context of organizing for social responsibility and global labor 
standards within networks (Section 3). This is imperative for two reasons: first of all, 
social responsibility schemes at the enterprise level are but one element, albeit a cru-
cial one, in the development of a regulatory regime of global labor standards; sec-
ondly, it is important to understand how the opportunities and constraints arising 
from the general political and economic context affect the organization of social re-
sponsibility in global production networks.  
The paper will conclude with a summary of arguments for the development of 
codes as a constructive instrument of network governance in achieving adequate la-
bor standards (Section 4). In pointing to further research needs, we emphasize that fu-
ture studies should continue to focus on the network form of production governance 
in the apparel and other labor-intensive industries. In doing so, a crucial step forward 
in the research process will be to extend the empirical basis to include, as some stud-
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ies have already done, management and employees in supplier firms,1 emphasizing 
especially the ways in which agents actually draw on network structures in their prac-
tices and, thereby, reproduce or transform these very structures. 
2. Organizing Responsibility under Different Forms of Production  
Governance  
For some time now, interest has been growing among firms, and especially in 
multi-national corporations (MNCs), in presenting themselves wherever they do 
business as good corporate citizens. Corporate social responsibility may cover a 
broad range of topics, but it invariably includes a commitment to certain minimum 
labor standards. The goal of „decent” working conditions for employees is not only 
pursued with regard to the firm itself. There is evidence that it is being formulated to 
include employees of suppliers, subcontractors and joint venture partners as well, 
even if still on a limited scale.  
Codes of conduct have become the favored instrument for implementing corpo-
rate social responsibility in regard to labor (and environmental) standards. The OECD 
has documented some 233 codes and, in a further study, examined a total of 246 
codes. (OECD 2000a, 2000b; Scherrer/Greven 2001: 78-82; see also the codes listing 
at http://www.coc-runder-tisch.de/). A few of the codes have been issued by industry 
and consumer associations or have been negotiated with unions and/or campaign 
networks.2 In the last few years, sectorally independent standards such as SA 8000 or 
AA 1000 have become more attractive to corporate management (DeRuisseau 2002; 
Waddock et al. 2002). But today, the regulatory regime of codes is still a patchwork 
of unilateral policy statements by single enterprises, conveying the intent of the com-
pany to create and maintain acceptable living and working conditions at their own 
places of business, and, in some cases, at those of their immediate partners. In defin-
ing such conditions it is most common to draw on some or all of the four core labor 
standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO): (1) freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (2) the elimination 
of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (3) the effective abolition of child labor; 
and (4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation 
(ILO 1998).3 Codes may also include a combination of any of the following points: 
the right to a minimum wage and an employment relation based on a contract; limita-
tions on working hours; the right to payment for overtime; the recognition of health 
                                                          
1  See also in this regard the work of such organizations as Global Alliance   
(http://www.theglobalalliance.org/main.cfm). 
2  A well-know example is the World Soccer Federation (FIFA) code negotiated with the inter-
national unions ICFTU, ITGLWF and FIET. http://www.cleanclothes.org/codes/fifa.htm 
3  Nevertheless, direct reference to ILO core labor standards is the exception (Blanpain 2000: 
49). 
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and safety standards; or the obligation of suppliers and sub-contractors to uphold the 
standards stipulated by the code.  
The increasing interest of shareholders4 and, above all, the pressure of consum-
ers, unions, globalization critical activists and the more general political debate on the 
regulation of globalization, has forced MNCs to position themselves as good corpo-
rate citizens, not in the least in respect to labor standards (Aaronson/Reeves 2002). 
Increasingly, corporate management recognizes that adherence to standards of social 
responsibility is a key factor for them in sustaining brand value and in preventing 
losses to shareholders, a position supported by management studies which encourage 
the adoption of codes (Emmelhainz/Adams 1999; Scherer/Smid 2000). Rolf Thüsing, 
president of the International Employers Organization, seems to confirm this ap-
proach in pointing out that compliance with codes is necessary „to improve the image 
of the company and/or the product and thus gain a competitive advantage”, or to 
avoid being „exposed to public criticism with ensuing loss of the company's image 
and economic damage” (Thüsing 2000: 95). However, the actual implementation of 
labor standards is a major organizational and, in markets and networks, an inter-
organizational challenge. 
2.1 Governance of Global Commodity Chains: Market, Hierarchy or Network? 
In general terms, economic activities at the local, regional, national or global 
level may be governed via the market, by hierarchy or networks, or by a combination 
of two or three of these modes. In the market mode, price competition is the predomi-
nant factor in determining inter-organizational relationships which, in consequence, 
are of a fluid nature. The hierarchical mode, by contrast, is characterized by an inter-
nalized corporate governance structure. Such intra-organizational relationships are 
deemed to be more binding and stable. In this mode, voice – to use Hirschman’s 
(1970) well-known axiom – is more important then exit. In the end, economic activity 
is coordinated by „fiat” (Williamson 1985) although this mechanism may be veiled 
by a participatory leadership style and a high-commitment culture.  
In contrast to market and hierarchy, the governance mode of the network is still 
very much debated. Inter-organizational networks are either considered to be „hy-
brid” (Williamson 1985), in essence combining market and hierarchical forms of co-
ordination, or to resemble „neither market nor hierarchy” (Powell 1990).5 In this lat-
                                                          
4  Aside from the ethical concerns which may motivate both shareholders and top management 
on this issue, there seems to be a positive or at least a neutral relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and financial performance. Moreover, the social investment movement 
(http://www.socialfunds.com/), shareholder activism for corporate social responsibility and 
increased transparency of corporate responsibility data has grown to be a recognizable deter-
minant of managerial decision-making (Waddock et al. 2002). 
5  Most recently Teubner (2002) has even proposed that „hybrids” and „networks” are two „dif-
ferent social institutions with distinct characteristics.” 
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ter case, the coordinative mechanism is still an open question. While many argue that 
reciprocity, cooperation and trust are the constitutive features of the network form of 
organizing, others focus on negotiations, obligations, distributed and yet coordinated 
responsibilities, or on the relational character of the contract (see Sydow/Windeler 
2000 for an overview). Frenkel (2001) portrays these relationships in the athletic 
footwear industry as being „quasi-obligational” and contrasts their collaborative form 
with compliance patterns found elsewhere which are more resembling of arms-length 
transactions (Frenkel/Scott 2002). Whatever the coordinative mechanism and its des-
ignation may be, this organizational form is – even in the case of „dynamic networks” 
(Miles/Snow 1986) – characterized by rather stable, albeit complex, relationships 
which are not only the object of organizing activities but influence these very activi-
ties as well. Thus, managers of the more or less independent network firms may ne-
gotiate and reach agreement on formal as well as informal rules which sustain long-
term collaborative relationships. In turn, the quality of these relationships is decisive 
for the manner in which such negotiations are conducted and agreements reached. 
Focusing on these collaborative relationships is not, of course, to ignore the fact that 
resources – the basis of power and domination – are often asymmetrically distributed 
in networks. 
Using the concept of global commodity chains (GCC) Gereffi et al. (1994) have 
addressed the spread of the network mode of economic relationships and pointed to 
the asymmetric authority and power relationships characteristic of this type of net-
work: ”A GCC consists of sets of inter-organizational networks clustered around one 
commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another 
within the world-economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially con-
structed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic 
organization“ (Gereffi et al. 1994: 2). In addition to an input-output dimension and a 
territoriality, GCC have „a governance structure (i.e., authority and power relation-
ships) that determine(s) how financial, material, and human resources are allocated 
and flow within a chain” (Gereffi 1994: 97). The author claims that two types have 
emerged over the past two decades: producer-driven and buyer-driven chains. The 
former are controlled by large transnational corporations or other industrial enter-
prises, while control over buyer-driven commodity chains is exercised closer to the 
point of consumption. At the strategic core of the latter kind of network which is 
likely to be found in labor intensive rather than technology intensive industries there 
is a multinational ‘retailer’ focusing on research, design and marketing, and, while 
outsourcing production to an extensive network of suppliers and subcontractors, play-
ing the role of a „network broker” (Miles/Snow 1986). 
As with any structure – a point emphasized by structuration theory (Giddens 
1984) –  market, hierarchy or network as a particular mode of governance, it enables 
and restricts the global organization of socially responsible production in its own 
manner. The conventional (neoclassical) view is that, if social responsibility matters 
at all, customers would express their preferences for goods and services which have 
been produced under humanly tolerable conditions. If producers fail to offer respec-
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tive goods or services, they would have to withdraw from the market. Hence, the 
market is able to process the relevant information and „govern“. If the relevant activi-
ties have been internalized, the hierarchy is also thought of as being capable to gov-
ern production in a socially responsible manner. In the end, hierarchical fiat would be 
considered as guaranteeing the implementation of adequate forms of production 
within the firm or group of firms (corporation). In reality, both forms of governance, 
market and hierarchy, but also networks, have been extensively criticized for failing 
in this respect.6 Is then the network form of organization more suitable for attaining a 
socially responsible production of goods and services? 
2.2 Organizing for Social Responsibility in Inter-firm Networks: Boon or Bane? 
To begin with, network forms of organization are correctly regarded as being re-
sponsible for a kind of work organization which is on the advance and, in the extreme 
case and then quite justifiably, labeled as „sweatshop”. This is in particular the case 
when production – and hence work – is externalized to avoid high labor standards 
and to save on production costs, especially in labor intensive sectors such as the ap-
parel industry. Cross-border externalization is commonly associated with „regime 
shopping” (Waddington 1999; Traxler/Woitech 2000), which depicts the availability 
of an abundance of goods and services to choose from in a variety of national set-
tings.  
However, inter-organizational networks also provide, as we will argue here 
based on a structuration perspective (Giddens 1984; Sydow/Windeler 1998), quite 
unique possibilities for organizing social responsibility. In comparison to the market 
form of governance, the network may be considered superior in this respect for at 
least two reasons. First, inter-organizational cooperation supports the development of 
shared views and norms (rules of signification and rules of legitimation in structura-
tionist terms), not only as to which working conditions are acceptable, but also as to 
how a socially responsible form of work organization can be implemented for the 
mutual benefit of all or at least a substantial portion of the participants in the network. 
Second, inter-organizational networks permit resource relationships or even the pool-
ing of resources (of domination in structurationist terms) to a degree otherwise of-
fered only by hierarchical forms of coordination. Some even consider networks to be 
the organizational form for combining unique resources and competencies (Eisen-
hardt/Schoonhoven 1996). In the case of labor standards, for example, the availability 
of network resources could enable – and coax – a member firm lacking its own re-
sources to implement desired changes. Many Third World producers have neither the 
know-how nor the financial means to upgrade working conditions to acceptable lev-
els, but through the intervention of a network hub firm, an efficient solution could be 
realized.  
                                                          
6  See http://www.corpwatch.org/; http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/ or (Kühl 2002) and WRC 
(2002) for examples. 
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When it comes to the implementation of global labor standards, the hierarchical 
mode may nevertheless be superior to the network mode of governance. The use of 
power and authority makes the enforcement of regulations significantly easier and the 
effective distribution of responsibility more likely within this mode. However, since 
the trend seems to be a movement from hierarchy to market and networks and, more 
specifically, within the network mode from producer-driven to buyer-driven com-
modity chains (Gereffi et al. 1994: 7), it is becoming less and less likely that hierar-
chical organizational forms will be a future focal point for organizing decent working 
conditions. Although mergers and acquisitions (and thus hierarchy) continue to be at-
tractive, examples from labor-intensive industries such as footwear and apparel indi-
cate that foreign owned subsidiaries are not the preferred organizational basis for 
global production and commodity chains. Where they are, they have not escaped the 
critical eye of campaign networks (e.g. http://www.cleanclothes.org).  
Certain structural conditions are necessary for the network mode of coordination 
to be effective in governing global commodity and production chains in support of 
realizing good corporate citizenship. The first and most obvious condition concerns 
network size. Clearly, a limited number of network firms reduces the complexity of 
managing the network. Where a large size network is unavoidable, its functionality 
will require equally strong intra- and inter-organizational capacities and capabilities 
on the part of network firms. Second, the inter-organizational relationships, or ‘lines’ 
of the network, should represent tightly rather than loosely coupled relationships. The 
very „strength of strong ties” (Krackhardt 1992) is that they are more likely to sup-
port intensive communication, mutual understanding, and adequate means of resource 
usage although, at least from a structuration perspective, strong ties may not only en-
hance but also result from intensive communication, mutual understanding, and re-
source transfer. Third, social responsibility should be easier to organize in „strategic 
networks” (Jarillo 1988; Sydow 1992). These centralized polycentric systems 
(„buyer-driven“ chains in Gereffi's terminology) are led by one or several hub firms 
and are certainly the most typical governance form of commodity and production 
chains. When the hub firm is capable of organizing for social responsibility and, in 
addition, located in a country with an institutional environment that requires and sup-
ports socially responsible network leadership, it is more likely to develop an interest 
in and a competence for organizing and managing the network in a way that supports 
the implementation of global labor standards. The fact that some or even most hub 
firms maintain supplier relationships of both the collaborative and the more market-
like compliance (Frenkel/Scott 2002) variety may not only result from the hub firm’s 
strategy. Such arrangements are likely to be influenced by the interest and, in particu-
lar, the competence of the supplier firm for organizing decent work.   
From a structuration perspective it is particularly obvious that network struc-
tures, even if they include, as in the case of strategic networks, some hierarchical 
elements, as such, do not guarantee socially responsible management. Rather, net-
work structures have to be used by agents, i.e. managers, but also other stakeholders, 
in a manner that enhances social responsibility in general and implements labor stan-
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dards in particular. In this respect, a collaborative negotiation-based approach incor-
porating a system of training and auditing and using mutually recognized incentives 
and sanctions has a better chance of success throughout the network than a more au-
thoritarian approach, although in some cases, a mixture of these two ideal types may 
also be effective. Consensus agreement on codes and procedures for their implemen-
tation should in turn improve the collaborative ‘culture' within the network even fur-
ther.  
Especially if compared to markets, a network form of organization has a greater 
potential for building and sustaining such a positive cycle of cooperation. Ideally, co-
operative and trusted relationships in a network with a limited number of members 
enable a hub firm to monitor the working conditions at its suppliers and joint venture 
partners and develop the training and supportive incentives necessary to induce the 
required improvements. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, network structures, as all 
structures, do not only support but also restrain action. For instance, network struc-
tures typically co-evolve with inter-organizational dependencies which, in turn, may 
allow certain suppliers and partners to block the implementation of social standards in 
their factories.7 Even more problematic, and far from being the exception in such sec-
tors as the global apparel industry, is the fact that, at the creation of a network, initial 
conditions may not reflect cooperation and trust. In this case, much time and effort 
would have to be invested up front in order to establish desirable network relation-
ships.  
2.3 Interplay Between Network Structures and Intra-organizational Structures 
Contrary to the beliefs of some scholars and practitioners, firms within networks 
are not really „boundaryless” (Ashkenas et al. 1995), nor do they dissolve into net-
works. Rather, the network form of organization helps firms and other types of or-
ganizations to survive as social systems in an increasingly complex and dynamic en-
vironment. For this reason alone, intra-organizational structures, i.e. the concrete 
shape of the hierarchies, continue to matter in inter-organizational networks, not the 
least with respect to socially responsible management.  
This is particularly true with regard to the (internal) organization of the hub 
firm.8 For instance, installing a responsibility officer or even setting up a social re-
sponsibility task force will have an impact upon the firm and the leadership of the in-
ter-firm network that is likely to be very different from the delegation of this task to 
the public relations department. The latter will certainly increase the „social responsi-
                                                          
7  And at times there will be economic considerations (e.g. pressures for low prices) which 
could even force them reject their introduction. 
8  Nevertheless, the intra-organizational structures and practices of supplier firms matter as well. 
For instance, strong lines of communication across the different hierarchical levels of a sup-
plier has been found to support cooperative relationships in implementing the buyer's code of 
conduct (Frenkel/Scott 2002). 
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bility rhetoric” (Boje 1999), but the network structures are not likely to change in any 
substantial respect towards improved working conditions in Third World factories. 
Substantial changes seem to require not only a local presence of the hub firm in the 
region (e.g. by means of regional import offices) but also a considerable degree of in-
tegration of the operational aspects of labor and human resource management, of re-
ward, information and reporting systems into its day-to-day operations (Waddock et 
al. 2002). 
Conversely, the formulation and implementation of codes of conduct or other 
regulation instruments on behalf of labor standards via a socially responsible network 
management is likely to affect the internal organization of firms throughout the net-
work. For instance, a network-wide implementation of labor standards will make the 
coordination of the network easier and, hence, unburden or even relieve the top man-
agement and the relevant departments (e.g. procurement) of certain control duties. 
With regard to rules of signification and legitimation this would enhance a shared un-
derstanding of how quality and efficiency is organized in the network. Moreover, and 
with regard to resources of domination, it could reduce the turnover of suppliers and 
contribute to network stability because of the need for some relation-specific invest-
ments for implementing the code which increase switching costs.  
Another dimension of the recursive interplay between network structures and the 
internal structures of the firm concerns the collaboration between management and 
labor representatives. While management and shop-level employee representatives 
(such as works councilors) or union officials in the national context of the hub firm 
may be willing to work together to generate a policy of social responsibility, a similar 
context of cooperation is seldom available at the international level. Equally detri-
mental to building a functional negotiating environment is the precarious trade union 
situation in many countries of the developing world, where there are often no union 
representatives at the enterprise or industry level to bargain with, because the unions 
are too weak or because of a government ban (Levine 1997). The spread of instru-
ments for ensuring labor standards throughout the network will thus depend greatly 
on the extent to which the economic activity of the network is focused exactly in 
those countries which do not have comprehensive labor regulations or free trade un-
ions as well as on the chances which a network could develop to facilitate the em-
powerment of employees as stakeholders in the interest of this goal.  
2.4 Codes of Conduct and their Implementation in Global Production Networks: 
Examples from the Apparel Industry 
An explorative study of three leading enterprises (two retailers and one manu-
facturer) and their supplier ‘networks’ in the global apparel industry disclosed that 
they were among the first apparel retailers/manufacturers in Germany to draft and 
implement codes of conduct, first within their own organizations and subsequently 
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moving down the supply chain.9 Nevertheless, the study makes it clear that even 
those firms with a widely acknowledged leading role in introducing and spreading 
regulation standards for labor are still quite far from their goal of a socially responsi-
ble organization of the buyer-driven commodity chains. The reasons for that will be 
explored after some more information on the development and implementation of 
these particular codes is given. 
The codes of all three firms, first published in 1998 and 1999 and later revised, 
are quite comprehensive, detailed, publicly accessible and largely based on the core 
labor standards of the ILO. Whether the initiative for the introduction of these codes 
came from within the enterprises or whether they were introduced as a result of grow-
ing public pressure directed at these firms by NGOs and campaign networks (such as 
the Clean Clothes Campaign), is an open question. In the three cases investigated it 
seems that both factors were contributive sources.  
Once the decision had been reached by management to implement an enterprise-
specific code, all three firms invested significantly in the goal of implementing the 
codes successively on three levels: within the hub organization, in their own supplier 
network and throughout the industry. The implementation of codes on the organiza-
tional level is marked by at least two important aspects: one is gaining and sustaining 
acceptance for the issue throughout the internal hierarchy, another is the task of de-
veloping the intra-organizational structure which will enable the enterprise to incor-
porate the issue into its supplier network. While two of the firms have set up a new 
department for social (and environmental) affairs, the third has intentionally rejected 
this approach, opting instead for the integration of the issue into existing structures. 
In only one of the three firms did the works council participate in this process of 
drafting and implementing the code. According to the managers interviewed, none of 
the German unions were involved in this process.  
On the level of the supplier network, essential support for implementation was 
provided by the experience gained at the organizational hub level, enabling all three 
firms to move decisively toward spreading their codes throughout their networks. 
Their approach was to train managers of the suppliers in improving labor practices 
                                                          
9  In a joint project with students in business administration and political science we evaluated 
annual reports and material available in trade journals and on the internet and, in addition, 
conducted semi-structured interviews with four managers in charge of social responsibility 
concerns at three leading German retail/manufacturing firms: Adidas-Salomon AG, 
Herzogenaurach; Karstadt Warenhaus AG, Essen; OTTO Versand GmbH & Co., Hamburg. 
Clothing is the main business of the latter two firms but also of increasing importance in the 
case of Adidas, one of the leading athletic footwear ‘manufacturers’. For more information on 
these firms and the project see the full report (in German) at http://www.polwiss.fu-
berlin.de/tu/ download/projekt.pdf. The authors wish to thank our interview partners for their 
willingness to participate in this study, and the students for their contributions in researching 
and writing the report. In addition we thank Charles Bodwell not only for his helpful advice in 
the starting phase of this project but also for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  
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and standards in their factories, to develop participative approaches to managing la-
bor issues, and to audit the working conditions in these factories in close proximity to 
a training program.  
 The training itself is carried out by experts of the hub firms who are familiar with 
the local cultural and institutional patterns. In two of the three cases only the man-
agers of immediate suppliers were trained, but they were required to inform and 
train the management of their subcontractors in turn. Only in one case was the 
management of second tier suppliers also included in the training program.  
 The auditing process included the same layers of the supplier network. However, 
auditing was conducted only once a year, either for all suppliers or for a sample 
of potentially problematic suppliers only.10 The participation of external auditors 
has been the exception, but the firms reported discussion on possible changes in 
this policy. If violations were detected during the audit, all three firms followed 
the ILO recommendation not to discontinue the supplier relationship but to first 
attempt to work with the factory management in order to improve the conditions 
of work.  
As far as the industry level is concerned, all three firms were among the initia-
tors of the social responsibility debate within their respective trade association. This 
level of regulation has the advantage over the other two of potentially cutting transac-
tion costs in the regulation of suppliers serving multiple buyers and of being able to 
level the playing field for all competitors. From the point of view of the firms with 
their own functional codes it has the drawback that they may no longer use corporate 
social responsibility as an argument for competitive advantage. But since the respec-
tive codes of the trade associations are not binding and as such have not yet been 
adopted by all members firms, this opportunity is not (yet) lost. Moreover, as the 
White House Apparel Partnership demonstrates, agreeing on codes of conducts and 
procedures for implementing them is quite difficult on the industry level (Block et al. 
2001: 281-282) and thus not likely to occur soon on a broad scale. 
The three cases investigated demonstrate that the implementation of codes of 
conduct, especially in supplier networks which span many developing countries and 
are quite extensive, is less than complete. In two of the three firms the networks in-
clude from 1,000 to 5,000 main suppliers and 5,000 to more than 10,000 subcontrac-
tors. This is an indication of the quantitative dimension of the implementation task 
and helps explain why training and social auditing in these two cases is, and is likely 
to remain, incomplete. Only the network led by the manufacturer is significantly 
smaller, encompassing 570 firms on both levels.11 In this network, the organizational 
                                                          
10  A discussion of types of social auditing and the difficulties involved is provided by DeRuis-
seau (2002). 
11  Adidas's main business is sport footwear (which earn about 40 percent of the revenue). Al-
though its supplier network for clothing is significantly smaller than that of the two retailers, 
it is quite similar in terms of complexity and stability. 
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practices of most member firms – generally suppliers in developing countries – are 
monitored. Moreover, the majority of managers of first-tier suppliers has already 
been trained in the role of codes and their implementation. In all three cases, man-
agement is seeking to consolidate the number of suppliers at least at the first tier 
level, in part as a means of easing implementation of their codes. 
More important than the mere network size is the fact that not all nodes and lines 
which are part of the sourcing structure can be considered to be part of a ‘network’ as 
defined above. In particular, the relationships between subcontractors and their sup-
pliers (often tiny workshops or homeworkers) are not at all likely to constitute coop-
erative inter-organizational relationships based upon mutual trust and commitment. 
Rather, they are highly volatile, with management estimating that some 20-25 percent 
of the suppliers in the ‘network’ are turned over per year. Price competition on this 
layer of relationships is particularly severe, and the resulting supplier relationships, 
respectively, short-lived. A further reason for the high turnover of ‘network’ mem-
bers in the apparel business, apart from severe price competition, is the seasonal fash-
ion dependency of this industry, still another is technological. In contrast to garment 
manufacturing, the footwear industry requires significantly greater investments in re-
search and development as well as in production equipment. In consequence, athletic 
footwear is usually manufactured in very large factories (Frenkel 2001), while gar-
ment production is generally found in rather small or medium-sized factories.  
The network character of buyer-driven commodity chains beyond the inner 
sourcing rings (Gereffi 1994: 110-114) is questioned further by the fact that hub 
firms in this industry sometimes use intermediaries to source clothing, often from 
particularly low-cost production sites. To include this segment in the network makes 
it not only significantly more complex but gives it a more market-like character. Only 
under particular circumstances may it be possible for a hub firm to control the sourc-
ing strategy of these intermediaries. A minimum requirement would be to create a 
network-type of relationship with the intermediaries and ‘force’ them to source only 
from suppliers that comply with minimum labor standards. We found intermediaries 
in at least one of the cases we investigated. And significantly, hub firms which have 
not developed codes for labor standards comparable to the ones in our three firm 
sample are more likely to use the market- rather than the network-type of relation-
ships in general and large-volume intermediaries and brokers in particular. 
In sum, the three cases studied illustrate not only the use of codes of conduct 
among leading firms in the apparel industry but also the relevance of the theoretically 
derived organizational and inter-organizational categories used to characterize the 
conditions that support or hinder the implementation of such codes in global com-
modity and production chains. However, such an analysis would be incomplete with-
out a consideration of the wider institutional context of organizing for social respon-
sibility in networks. For on the one hand, social responsibility schemes at the enter-
prise level are but one element in creating an international regulatory regime of labor 
standards. On the other hand, it is important to understand how the opportunities and 
constraints arising from the general political and economic context under which both 
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hub and supplier firms operate, affect the organization of social responsibility in 
global production networks. 
3. The Institutional Context of Organizing for Social Responsibility in  
Production Networks 
The proliferation of codes over the past few years has added a new link in the 
creation of a regulation chain and has kindled a broad debate over the efficacy of this 
tool in addressing the issue of global labor standards. While supporters of codes point 
to the advantages of having economically powerful MNCs showing a preparedness to 
become positively engaged in such a controversial issue, their critics emphasize that 
as a standard-setting instrument, codes suffer from the double drawback of being vol-
untary, private initiatives and of not being legally binding.  
As we have shown (see Section 2), the effective implementation of a code in an 
entire global commodity and production chain will be extremely difficult even when 
favorable conditions are provided by a network organization. In addition to their 
piecemeal nature and the limits of their applicability, codes have also been criticized 
as being used for public relations only or even to avoid effective and comprehensive 
controls and the introduction of an internationally recognized public regulatory re-
gime (for example Köhnen 2002). Moreover, some argue convincingly that codes of 
conduct can only be effective in industries such as apparel, which are dependent on 
image-sensitive branding. In addition they are likely to be developed and imple-
mented only as long as public pressure is sustained, whereas social movements and 
campaigns are prone to come and go. This seems to be particularly true in the case of 
consumer movements (Scherrer/Greven 2001: 129).  
While the complexity of the issue at stake could inhibit the sustainability of pub-
lic pressure on MNCs and other firms, the breadth of the current discussion of global 
labor standards and corporate social responsibility as well as the active involvement 
of a variety of actors such as national states, international institutions, trade unions, 
NGOs, non-profit auditors and certification boards seems to mitigate against the issue 
fading from the public eye. At the center of controversy is not only the question of 
what are fair labor standards, but also the questions of who should be responsible for 
their enactment and how this responsibility should be exercised and the standards en-
forced. While there is partial evidence of a basic minimum consensus regarding the 
first question (Scherrer 2001), widely recognized solutions to the other questions are 
still nowhere to be seen. Above all, the instruments and the rights for setting and con-
trolling labor standards internationally in general and in the privatized realm of enter-
prise codes in particular are hotly contested (Weiss 2001).  
3.1 The ILO and the WTO as the Standard Bearers? 
Although there are more than 180 ILO Conventions and nearly 200 ILO Rec-
ommendations, the politically relevant positions adopted by the ILO are the so-called 
core labor standards centered around four fundamental principles and rights (see 
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above Section 2), which were reaffirmed in the ILO Declaration of June 1998. In ad-
dition, in 2000, the Governing Body of the ILO amended its 1977 Tripartite Declara-
tion of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE 
Declaration) to adhere to the 1998 ILO Declaration. In the fields of development pol-
icy, rights at work, employment, training, conditions of work and industrial relations, 
this new statement sets out voluntary guidelines with the aim of encouraging „the 
positive contribution which MNC can make to economic and social progress and to 
minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise, 
taking into account the United Nations resolutions advocating the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order“ (ILO 2000a). 
Both the 1998 Declaration and the MNE Declaration illustrate quite well why 
the ILO is criticized as the „toothless tiger“: While it has developed and issued fun-
damental standards for the world of work, and has increased its effectiveness in moni-
toring the recognition and application of its norms, it is woefully lacking in the means 
of enforcement. Technical assistance programs under ILO direction may alleviate 
some of the worst offenses. But in the end, the ILO is dependent upon the coopera-
tion of the targeted national government, which may lack the willingness or capabil-
ity to support the ILO's rectification program. To overcome such deficiencies, sup-
porters of comprehensive global labor standards have proposed the introduction of 
social clauses into trade agreements under the auspices of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). As proposed by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU), the WTO is called upon to establish a joint WTO/ILO Committee or work-
ing group mandated to review alleged violations of ILO core labor standards. Before 
initiating any „appropriate multilateral action“ (sanctions), offers of dialogue, techni-
cal assistance and further review of progress in correcting the problem would be 
made (ICFTU/ICATU 2001). Assuming that there are long-term advantages for coun-
tries and economic regions to respect and promote the application of the ILO core labor 
standards (Scherrer 1998), the aim of anchoring social clauses in trade agreements 
would be to help countries to give this goal priority over the perceived short-term po-
litical and economic advantages of cost undercutting (Scherrer 2001: 15). 
3.2 International Unions: Lobbying, Collective Bargaining or Activism? 
The viability of the social clause strategy has been increasingly questioned lately 
even among its supporters, in the main because there has been no noticeable progress 
made within the WTO on the adoption of this proposal. Indeed, there is a broad spec-
trum of opposition – including trade union organizations from developing countries – 
which rejects social clauses as an instrument of protectionism fostered by the indus-
trialized northern hemisphere (DGB-Bildungswerk 2001). At issue as well is the 
overall strategy mix of global union politics. Whereas concrete policies and activities 
in the interest of securing union recognition, improving working conditions and pro-
tecting workers' rights have been basically the responsibility of the national organiza-
tions, international union politics have been predominantly directed toward lobbying 
international institutions (Waterman 2001).  
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In this context, the internal debate within some global union federations is 
around the need to invest more resources in cross-border enterprise- and industry-
oriented union activities instead of lobbying international agencies or government 
bodies. Cross-border collective agreements are still a rarity (Koch-Baumgarten 1998; 
Quan 2000) because beyond national borders there is no „articulated union organiza-
tion” (Crouch 1993: 54). Indeed, the extent of interest differences, for example be-
tween unions in the industrialized world and those in developing countries, is often 
considerable. Moreover, unions are also faced with the difficulty of finding a social 
partner on the employers’ side for collective bargaining since in general, employers' 
associations with a mandate for collective bargaining do not exist beyond the national 
level.  
One union answer to the general dilemma of developing viable international 
strategies has been to link up with NGOs and campaign networks on particular issues. 
The Clean Clothes Campaign, which has directly targeted the apparel industry, is an 
example of such a link.12 At the same time, the history of this type of coalition as well 
as the role of union delegations at the World Social Forum 2002 in Porte Alegre show 
that this path does not offer a panacea for the problems unions face with regard to re-
alizing labor standards at the international level (Bernard 1997; Waterman 2001; 
Jacobi 2002). Another alternative which has been gaining support is the creation of 
multinational employee councils and the negotiation of single firm global agreements 
on workers' rights (Global agreements spread 2002; Volkswagen AG 2002; Daimler-
Chrysler 2002). While such cases have a contractual basis and thus in comparison to 
unilaterally formulated codes are a step toward increasing transparency and control, 
they also suffer from being piecemeal as they are (still) limited to the hierarchy of 
single MNCs.  
3.3 Social Dialogue or Competition? 
The political handling of the issue of global labor standards has been broad-
ened beyond the realm of established international institutions such as the ILO and 
the WTO, mainly through the nationally tested instrument of social dialogue or tri-
partite negotiations and agreements. There are any number of tripartite projects 
bringing together business, labor and government at the country level and centered 
around technical development support as conceived by the ILO13 such as those be-
ing planned under the auspices of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) (http://www.coc-runder-tisch.de/). Mention should also be made of a variety 
                                                          
12  In Germany both the DGB and the IG Metall have been actively involved in promoting the 
activities of the Clean Clothes Compagin (http://www.cleanclothes.org). Other important 
campaign networks in this industry are the Global Exchange (http://www.globalexchan-
ge.org), the Human Rights Watch ((http://www.hrw.org), and Sweatshop Watch  ((http:// 
www.sweatshop.org).  
13  For examples, see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/technical/index.htm 
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of national and international political forums such as the Arbeitskreis Menschen-
rechte und Wirtschaft (Working Group Human Rights and Business) in Germany 
(2002) or the United Nations Global Compact (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/), 
which attempt to include all relevant actors and foster social responsibility through 
voluntary participation, dialogue and persuasion.  
The spread of such initiatives of social dialogue has certainly increased the focus 
of interest on the topic of global labor standards, but it is doubtful that it has brought 
fundamental improvements to the working conditions of those in whose name the 
proclamations have been formulated. In contrast to the ILO or WTO, which could at 
least provide a comprehensive framework for institutionalizing labor standards on a 
global level, they are voluntary and piecemeal. And as with the ILO, they are lacking 
any means of independent control or enforcement.  
Overcoming this deficit has been the aim of various independent monitoring and 
certification agencies which have been gaining recognition in the debate over global 
labor standards and corporate social responsibility. MNCs have been the high profile 
members of such bodies as Social Accountability International (SAI) with its 
SA 8000 norm. But SA 8000 also has international union recognition, and union and 
NGO representatives are included on its advisory board, albeit in the minority. 
SA 8000 directly refers to all ILO core labor standards (and several more in addition) 
and is an attempt to develop a standard for social issues similar to the ISO norms. Its 
enforcement is handled by accredited auditors and the company to be audited bears 
the costs, turning certification into a potentially prohibitive exercise for many firms.14 
A contrasting example is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which is an interna-
tional certification body for wood and paper products with a set of basic social and 
environmental principles and nationally organized economic (business), social and 
environmental chambers. In Germany for example, members include the IG Metall 
(which represents woodworkers) and the IG BAU, the construction and forestry un-
ion, as well as Greenpeace and Robin Wood. Unlike SA 8000, which like ISO norms 
is process-based, FSC’s certification uses specific performance standards, according 
to which the end product must be certified throughout its „chain of custody” 
(http://www.fscoax.org/principal.htm). As such, by its claim to exercise control over 
products and supplies at all nodes of the commodity chain, the FSC takes an inherent 
network approach.  
Taking a diametrically different tack, Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung (2000) have 
proposed to harness the energy of competition in the interest of social responsibility 
and „ratcheting labor standards”. Their concept is to apply the qualities which have 
been the driving forces of globalizing capitalism to cover labor (and environmental 
standards) as well: Firms should compete systematically with each other in the field 
of labor standards as they do in regard to their productive capabilities. Using the al-
                                                          
14  As of June 2002, some 130 firms world-wide had been certified, 40 of which manufacture ap-
parel and textiles (http://www.cepaa.org/certification.htm). 
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ready existing competition among many brand-name MNCs regarding their „concern 
for their workforce and the environment”, ratcheting labor standards would establish 
„an on-going competition in which laggards pursue leaders and leaders attempt to 
out-do themselves because they know that no particular performance level confers 
lasting ascendancy.” The authors claim that such an approach would initially be fu-
eled by firm competition and consumer whistle-blowing, but „should in time include 
the forces and resources of national governments and international organizations” 
(Sabel et al. 2000: 2). But there is little evidence to suggest that such an approach 
would spread and motivate „laggards“ to participate. Much depends on the extent to 
which consumers (and buyers in general) demand goods and services produced under 
decent working conditions.  
3.4 Implications for Implementing Global Labor Standards in Production  
Networks 
Despite the problems and pitfalls in all of the approaches we have described, the 
goal of improving working conditions and achieving global standards of labor regula-
tion has benefited from their efforts. Indeed, over the past decade, the ILO has gained 
considerable recognition and made noticeable improvements in its watchdog capaci-
ties. While still not possessing outright instruments for sanctioning violations of its 
principles and conventions, the ILO monitoring and technical assistance programs 
have contributed to a climate of compliance and in some cases even enabled govern-
ments to overcome the causes of non-compliance (ILO 2000b: IX; Weisband 2000). 
Most recently, the ILO has concentrated many of its resources on the implementation 
issue and even adopted a kind of network perspective on private codes initiatives. 
One of the studies it has sponsored on this issue not only points to the barriers of im-
plementing codes in global commodity chains, it also proposes a model for overcom-
ing them which under the label of „Total Responsibility Management” (Waddock et 
al. 2002) uses insights from the TQM movement.  
The experience and recognized role of the ILO as standard bearer of the promo-
tion of fundamental principles and rights at work has also impacted the debate over 
social clauses at the WTO. Although there is no direct connection, the OECD guide-
lines, recently updated, also invoke recognition of the stakeholder approach shared by 
the ILO. Moreover, the proliferation of tri- and multi-partite forums of social dia-
logue devoted to the issue of global labor standards is hardly imaginable without the 
common denominator of ILO core labor standards. Such forums certainly have their 
self-promotional side, but likewise, they also contribute to a heightened awareness of 
this issue both nationally and internationally. For their own part, of course, NGOs 
and consumer activists (and to a lesser extent, trade unions) have built up the pressure 
necessary to induce steps toward remedial action and put labor rights in the forefront 
of the agenda of globalization debates. Without the existence of this political and in-
stitutional global framework, despite its present weaknesses, there would not only be 
less awareness of the problem, but also less initiative on the part of MNCs and other 
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firms to develop and implement codes of conducts in networks of production and 
commodity chains.  
Moreover, the development of a dialogue between agents within networks and 
outside of them opens a variety of possible options for upgrading codes of conduct 
from unilateral and voluntary stand-alone instruments of policy into an effective tool 
for securing good labor standards and corporate social responsibility. Considering the 
spread of the network form of organization in global commodity and production 
chains, the importance of harnessing its capacities for implementing social responsi-
bility, and the problematic goal of achieving universal norms of labor standards, the 
question could be raised as to whether the implementation of global labor standards 
in network organizations is a goal in which unions could participate and which they 
could address (Martinez Lucio/Weston 1995). International unionism has been an ac-
tive element in the various approaches described above, but although it is a stake-
holder, it has apparently not focused on the increasing importance of global networks 
as a distinct governance mechanism. In many countries, unions have historically or-
ganized along the commodity chain in their pursuit of industrial unionism, but today 
many chains cut across traditional industrial and national boundaries (Fichter/Zeuner 
2002). The particular type of engagement could be through contractual codes of con-
duct, independent monitoring and certification agencies, collective bargaining and 
autonomous union action, network works councils or other means, such as campaign 
liaisons with NGOs. All of these would represent a step beyond the single enterprise 
approach as well as an opportunity to break the impasse of institutional global labor 
politics. On the other hand, much would also depend on the particular approach and 
openness of management to organizing network governance.  
As we have pointed out above, the organizational form of the network is not ori-
ented per se toward the attainment of social norms such as minimum work standards, 
but depends on actor involvement for impulses in this direction. It would therefore 
seem imperative for national governments and international agencies as well as for 
labor unions and other partners in the social dialogue to recognize the existence of 
networks and to identify the kinds of strategies which will support the governance po-
tential of networks for the betterment of working conditions. Monitoring and certifi-
cation agencies such as the FSC, which audits along the product chain, are an exam-
ple of necessary steps in this direction.  
4. Codes Against Sweat? – Conclusions for Future Action and Research 
The violation of minimum labor standards by retailers and manufacturers acting 
as hub firms in global commodity and production networks and, more commonly, by 
their first- and second-tier suppliers, is certainly one of the dark sides of this new or-
ganizational form (Victor/Stephens 1994). From an optimistic point of view, less than 
„decent” working conditions in such factories may be unintentional consequences of 
organizing for economic competitiveness. At worst, however, they may just as well 
represent a deliberate strategy of MNCs and other firms located in the developed 
world in pursuit of low production costs at the expense of workers of Third World 
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countries. Codes of conduct, especially if applied in a defined network environment 
and used in an institutional context that supports their formulation and network-wide 
implementation, are a viable means of improving working conditions in these facto-
ries. Such a network organization for implementing codes against sweat is not an er-
satz for supplier self-governance. While self-governance may well be the long-term 
goal of some private codes of conduct policies (Henke 2002), in the middle-range, 
hub firms will need to rely on this instrument until suppliers are not only willing but 
also capable of taking on this responsibility themselves. Once achieved, it will 
strengthen the network form of organizing commodity and production chains. 
Several structural conditions which support implementation have been men-
tioned in the paper and illustrated with evidence from three explorative case studies 
from the global apparel industry: limited network size and thus manageable complex-
ity; the avoidance of increasing the level of in-transparency by using intermediaries; 
tightly rather than loosely coupled relationship, and hence trust, reciprocity and co-
operation; appropriate intra-organizational structures that support respective inter-
organizational practices. However, these structural properties are neither given, nor 
do they necessarily foster the implementation of codes per se. Rather, all network 
firms, or more precisely their managers and employees, as well as other stakeholders, 
have to relate to these properties in a way that guarantees that minimum labor stan-
dards are put into effect throughout the network. And they will need to take the steps 
necessary to begin a process of transforming supplier relationships from the price-
dominated market to the network mode of governance. Counter intuitively, one 
means of initializing such a transformation may be the very formulation and imple-
mentation of codes of conducts coupled with the suppliers’ proactive involvement in 
this process.  
How likely is it that this new organizational form will support the implementa-
tion of labor standards in the global economy? Within the commodity chain we have 
shown that under defined and controllable conditions and within a particular institu-
tional framework, network relationships present a viable context for establishing ac-
ceptable labor standards at the micro-level of the workplace. To ensure their imple-
mentation, we argue that agents, such as representatives of management, labor and 
consumers, must actively cooperate in order to use network structures for securing 
minimum labor standards, in turn reproducing these standards as structures of social 
responsibility. Nevertheless, there are limits to this approach. First of all, one should 
certainly be reminded that the network organization is primarily an organizational 
form which helps firms to generate profits from more efficient and effective organiza-
tion – including the use of those ‘efficiency’ effects that result from unacceptable 
working conditions. As such, the usage of this form for securing minimum labor 
standards throughout the world will most likely be only a by-product at best. How-
ever, this chance could and, in our view should, be utilized. All depends upon the 
agents who create structures and who are constituted by these structures (Giddens 
1984). Secondly, it is highly doubtful that production sites on the fringe of the net-
work can be controlled and upgraded in this way, especially if these sites are part of 
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the informal economy and/or situated in developing countries where institutions sup-
portive of agents in organizing for minimum labor standards are rare or non-existent. 
Thirdly, there will continue to be (hub) firms which prefer an exploitative low-cost 
strategy, with looser, more flexible and competitive supplier arrangements. Such a 
preference for the market over the network mode is likely to be successful as long as 
such firms and their products are not identifiable, high profile brand ‘manufacturers’ 
subject to public criticism.  
It is true that the most recent trend in developed countries towards e-pro-
curement on the electronic markets space of the internet will push the governance of 
global commodity and production chains once more towards the market (rather than 
the network). However, managers may well use this new technology for organizing 
social responsibility if, for instance, they allow only those suppliers to participate in 
the particular ‘market’ space which comply with minimum labor standards in their 
factories. Such an electronic market would not be entirely open and would thus re-
semble a network to some extent. But such a development will not come of its own. 
Actors' choices will be decisive as to whether the development of electronic markets 
contributes to the emergence rather than to the displacement of the network form. It 
would be useful, therefore, if agents – as well as researchers – paid more attention to 
the potentials and prospects of this form of global supply chain governance. 
The push for making codes an effective instrument of achieving global labor 
standards is growing on multiple levels, from the workplace to supra-national institu-
tions. But there is still a discernable discrepancy between the analytical arguments 
(and practical implementation claims) of the advantages networks offer on the one 
hand and the evidence of bad working conditions and ineffective codes which critics 
are continuously presenting on the other hand. Future research on the implementation 
of codes of conduct in global commodity chains should pursue and refine the analyti-
cal distinction between different modes of governance further and link this instrument 
to the political and institutional context of organizational forms. Moreover, in-depth 
analysis of compelling cases in other labor-intensive industries than apparel, includ-
ing on-site research at firms throughout the network and using a longitudinal design, 
are needed to focus more on processes, that is, on concrete intra- and inter-
organizational practices by which networks structures are produced and reproduced 
over time.  
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